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We argueinthis paper that the focus on employment effects in recent studies of minimum
wages ignores an important interaction between schooling, employment, and the minimum wage.
To study these linkages, we estimate a conditional logit model of employment and enrollment
outcomes for teenagers using state-year observations for the period 1977 to 1989. The results
show a negative influence of minimum wages on school enrollment and a positive effect on the
proportion of teens neither employed nor in school. We further suggest that our results are
consistent with substitution by employers of higher- for lower-skilled teenagers, with the
displaced teens ending up both out of work and out of school.
David Neumark William Waseher
Department of Economics Board of Governors of the
University of Pennsylvania Federal Reserve System
3718 Locust Walk 20th and Constitution Avenue, NW
Philadelphia. PA 19104 Washington, D.C 20551
and NBERRecent increases in minimum wages at the state and federal levels
and the debates surrounding these adjustments have renewed interest in the
labor market effects of minimum wage laws. Taking advantage of the
additional variation provided by new legislation. a number of recent studies
have reexamined the long-standing consensus that had emerged from the work of
the Minimum Wage Study Commission and others (see Brown at al. •1982)that
minimum wage laws reduce employment opportunities for youths (Card. 1992a.
l992b: Katz and Krueger. 1991. 1992; Spriggs. 1992; Card and Krueger. 1993:
Neumark and Wascher. 1992: and Taylor and Kim. 1993). A striking feature of
most of these studies (including ours) is that simple comparisons, or
regressions controlling for exogenous shifts in labor demand, do not reveal
disemployment effects of minimum wages for teenagers.
The recent set of studies of the minimum wage have focused on
estimating employment effects and have not explored in any detail the
potential implications for other aspects of the teenage labor market. In
this paper. we argue that the standard employment equations are suggestive of
an additional effect on youth labor market behavior. In particular, when the
school enrollment rate is controlled for in the employment equation. the
estimated disemployment effects of the minimum wage rise markedly. We
interpret the sensitivity of the minimum wage effect on employment to the
introduction of schooling controls as evidence that the recent literature has
missed an important influence of minimum wages that operates through
interactions between schooling, labor force participation. and minimum wages.
Thus. in this paper. we move beyond the earlier research and examine in more
detail the linkages between minimum wages. employment, and enrollment.
In our empirical work, we specify enrollment and employment as
jointly determined, and therefore add exogenous determinants of enrollment as
variables affecting employment. Our procedure does not significantly alter
the reduced-fort estimates of the disemployment effect of minimum wages.
However, we find that minimum wages also lead to a decline in the school
enrollment rate and an increase in the proportion of teenagers who are
neither employed nor enrolled. One hypothesis consistent with these findings
isthatlabor demand shifts toward higher-productivity teenagers after aminimum wage increase, and that these teenagers take jobs in lieu of
enrolling in school, in the process displacing lower-productivity teens from
employment. Alternatively, there may not be substitution away from the
lower-productivity workers, but rather a shift from enrollment to queuing for
minimum wage jobs. In either case, our results indicate effects of minimum
wages that are not revealed in the standard reduced-form estimates of the
effects of minimum wages on employment.
I. Reduced-Form Effects of Minimum Waees on Teenase Employment:
A Reinteroretatign
The basic dataset used in this paper is similar to that used in
Neumark and Wascher (1992). In particular, the sample consists of panel data
on the 50 states and Washington. D.C. for the period 1977-1989. Included in
the dataset are wariables measuring federal and state minimum wage lewels.
coverage by federal minimum wage statutes, and state averages (estimated from
May CBS files) of wage rates, unemployment rates, employment rates, school
enrollment rates, and the age composition of the state population. In
addition, we have augmented the standard set of explanatory variables used in
research on employment effects of minimum wages with information on statutory
schooling requirements and educational quality: specifically. the upper end
of the age range mandated by state compulsory schooling laws and awerage
teacher salaries (deflated by the consumer price index). In both cases, the
variables are intended to capture changes engineered by state and local
education officials that influence enrollment rates. Summary statistics for
each of the variables are shown in the appendix table.
To begin, we review evidenc, from the standard employment equation
estimated in much of the minimum wage literature:
(1) EftDNWit+Xij+tit
is the employment-to-population ratio for teenagers aged 16-19 in state i
at time t. HW is a measure of the coverage-adjusted relative minimum wage.
constructed as the federal coverage rate for the state, multiplied by the-3-
higher of the federal or state minimum wage level, divided by the average
wage in the state. Finally. X represents a set of control variables.
including fixed state and year effects.tile include in the regressions the
previous year's minimum wage variable along with the contemporaneous variable
in order to pick up the lagged effects of the minimum wage on employment that
were documented in Neumark and Wascher (1992).
Some previous research (e.g. Mincer. 1976; Abowd and Killingsworth.
1981; and Tauchen. 1981) has distinguished between minimum wage effects on
individuals covered and not covered by minimum wage laws, or has studied the
effects on each sector separately, an approach that might be relevant here as
well. However, lacking clear identifying information as to the
classification of individuals into those not covered by minimum wage laws and
those who are covered but whose equilibrium wage is above the minimum, we
have chosen here to address aggregated estimates as in equation (1) .Because
this aggregate equation is then a combination of observations for which the
minimum wage is binding and observations for which it is not (and for which
wage rates are determined by the intersection of the demand and supply
curves), equation (1) should be thought of as a reduced'form model that
includes both exogenous demand and supply shifters, Thus, the estimated
minimum wage coefficient should not be interpreted as a labor demand
elasticity. but rather as the net effect averaged over workers for whom the
minimum wage is and is not binding. (In Neumark and Wascher (1994) .we
provide an alternative approach to this issue.)
The first column of Table 1 shows the estimates of this standard
specification using our dataset. The estimates are based on a GLS estimator
that permits a block-diagonal covariance matrix, with heteroskedastic errors
across states and first-order autocorrelation in the residuals within states.
to obtain consistent estimates of the standard errors and efficient estimates
of the coefficients. Consistent with other recent studies that fail to find
disemployinent effects for teenagers, the elasticity of employment with
respect to a change in the minimum wage is small (-0.03) and is not
statistically significant.-4.
Because this equation is essentially a reduced-form model, it is
appropriate to include exogenous supply variables in the specification. A
variety of such variables have been used in past studies (for a survey see
Brown et al. .1981).aithough in column (1) of the table, we have used only a
cohort size variable. An alternative supply variable that has been used in
some previous minimum wage studies (e.g. Al'Salam et al. .1981:Ragan. 1977.
1981; Mattila, 1978, 1981) is school enrollment, Schooling is an important
alternative to work for many teenagers, and thus exogenOus variation in
enrollment can arguably influence employment rates,
The remainder of the jable reports estimates of the basic employment
equation that control for shifts in th. school enrollment raie.
Specifications using two alternative measures of enrollment are included to
ensure that the results are not overly sensitive to measurement or
definitional changes. The first (labeled Si) includes only teenagers who
were enrolled in school and were not in the labor force. This variable is
designed to capture enrollment decisions that preclude seeking employment.
The second definition of enrollment (labeled 52) includes all individuals who
reported that their major activity was school, This is a broader measure
that includes most iüdividuals who were both working and in school,
As shown in the second column, when the proportion enrolled in
school and not in the labor force is included in the regression (and treated
as exogenous), the elasticity jumps to -0.23 and is three times its standard
error. When the broader measure of enrollment is included instead (column
(3)). the minimum wage elasticity is the same (-0.23). but witha larger
standard error of 0.11. In both equations, the coefficient on the enrollment
variable is negative and significant, consistent with the view that
employment and enrollment are alternative activities for many teenagers.
A potential problem with a causal interpretation of the estimates
shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 is that th, enrollmentrate may be
endogenous, If exogenous factors that raise employment rates tend to lower
enrollment rates by drawing individuals out of school, then thisendogeneity
transmits a negative bias to the coefficient on the school enrollment
variable.(On the other hand, if exogenous factors that raise employment-5,
rates also lead individuals to remain in school or draw into school
individuals who previously were neither working nor in school, then the
endogeneity bias in the school enrollment coefficient is positive.) The
coefficient on Si may be especially prone to this type of bias because, as
Card. et al. (1994) point out, employment and enrollment (as defined by Si)
are mutually exclusive activities.
Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the estimates of minimum wage
effects in standard specifications such as equation (1) to the inclusion of
the school enrollment rate, even if overstated, suggests that exploring the
linkages between employment, enrollment, and the minimum wage may yield
additional insights into the workings of the youth labor market, Indeed. one
explanation of the sensitivity of the minimum wage coefficient to the
addition of controls for enrollment shifts might be that there is another
effect of the minimum wage through its influence on the teenage school
enrollment rate. In particular. if a higher minimum wage encourages
individuals to leave (or not enroll in) school in order to take a job, then
we would expect to see a larger negative effect of minimum wages on
employment after taking account of the negative partial correlation between
employment and school enrollment. In this case, the negative impact of
higher minimum wages on enrollment rates can be interpreted as a labor supply
response stemming from a demand shift towards the teenagers who would have
otherwise chosen to be enrolled in school.
To see this more clearly, suppose that, at the state level.
employment is determined by
(2) E —aJ4W+yS+£
whereS is the enrollment rate, a < 0 and y < 0 (as in the Table 1
estimates), and IC has been dropped. 1' is assumed to reflect the effect of
exogenous variation in S on E. If enrollment is negatively related to the
minimum wage through the reduced'form equation
(3) S —a'MW+a'-6-
where a' < 0. then the reduced form for the employment equation is
(4) E —(a+a'yJMW+t''
Inthis reduced form, the expected sign of the minimum wage coefficient may
be close to zero (or even positive) even though the individual minimum.wage
coefficients a and a' are negative. Note that if the minimum wage had no
effect on the school enrollment rate (so that a' 0) or if employment and
enrollment decisions were unrelated (so that y—0) ,thecoefficient on the
minimum wage in the employment equation would not be sensitive to the
exclusion or inclusion of the enrollment rate,
Previous research has identified correlations between minimum wage
changes and the schooling decisions of youths, although the evidence is
relatively scant and there is some disagreement about the direction of the
correlation. Using time-series data. Mattila (1978) finds a positive effect
of the minimum wage on school enrollment, which he argues suggests that
raising the minimum wage prompts teenagers to remain in school to increase
their likelihood of gaining employment in the covered sector in the future.
Ehrenberg and Marcus (1980. 1fl2) examine the effects of the minimum wage on
school enrollment with cross-section data. Using grouped data by state for
t970. they find very little evidence of an effect of the minimum wage on
enrollment. In contrast, their estimates derived from the 1966 National
Longitudinal Survey suggest that minimum wages reduce enrollment rates for
low-income teenagers and increase enrollment rates for teenagers from high'
income families. Cunningham (1979) also finds that a higher minimum wage
reduces enrollment: we will return to his results in more detail later in the
paper. Finally. Card (1992b) finds a negative partial correlation between
school enrollment and the minimum wags in his study of the 1988 increase in
California's minimum wage. In the next section. we turn to a fuller
characterization of minimum wage effects on employment and enrollment of
teenagers using our dataset..7-
II. Minimum Waee Effects on Enrollment and Emnlovment
The Empirical Approach
Our modeling strategy is basedonthe assumption that youths choose
among a set of J alternative activities (york. school. etc.). with the choice
influenced by a set of determinants. X. In particular. let
—1(X)+t: k—i jl
be the probability that individual k chooses activity j.In this framework.
X includes variables relating to the costs of participating in each activity
(e.g. schooling costs and foregone leisure) and the benefits from
participation (e.g. current and future wage rates), while unmeasured
individual specific tastes and abilities as well as unmeasured costs and
benefits are captured in e.
Averaging over individuals (for example. for each state and year).
the proportion of teenagers choosing a particular activity becomes
(6) —g(X')+C': ji .1.
Average differences in the unobservables are captured in the error term. c'.
In addition, some elements of X that were exogenous to individuals are
endogenous with respect to the aggregate proportions (e.g. the market wage
for teenagers). and so X' has been redefined as the exogenous determinants of
the costs and benefits of each activity. In this sense, equation (6) can be
viewed as a set of reduced-form equations. subject to the constraint that the
sum of the proportions is equal to one.
This framework gives rise to the conditional logit model suggested
by McFadden (1973) .Inparticular. we specify employment and enrollment as
jointly determined by a set of exogenous variables, including the minimum
wage. In the results shown below, we employ grouped data to estimate the
parameters of the multinomial logit specification. This approach has been
used in previous analyses of the youth labor market by Ehrenberg and Marcus
(1980. 1982) •and Wachter and Kim (1982).-8-
Following Ehrenberg and Marcus. we divide the youth population into
four mutually exclusive categories of youth activity, distinguished by
employment status and enrollment status. Specifically. SN! is the proportion
of individuals in school but not employed; SE is the proportion of
individuals in school and employed: ENS is the proportion of individuals
employed but not in school: and NSNE is the proportion of individuals not in
school and not employed. We consider several groupings of these activities
in the results that follow, but in the terminology of the GLS estimates
presented in Table 1. El? —SE+ ENS. $1 —SN!.and £2 —SN!+ SE.(The
inexact correspondence between 51 and SN! reflects the fact that the use of
the employment status recode of the C?S for the construction of Si causes
individuals both unemployed and in school to be excluded from this measure.
while the use of the major activity variable to distinguish the alternative
activities in this section leads to the inclusion of such individuals in
S NE.)
Given the categorization just described, the conditional logit model
is comprised of a set of equations specifying the logarithms of the odds
ratios as functions of a set of independent variables:
(7a) log(SNE/NSNE) —a11MW
+ 1 + X,D1 + tlit
(7b) log(SE./NSNE.) —a21MW+ a22MWj+ +
(7c) log(ENS.t/N5NE.)c13iMw1 + j32MW j + + t3it
where i indexes states and t indexes time. This set of equations is
estimated with grouped state-year observations as in Table 1. The exogenous
variables used in the estimation include the current and lagged relative
coverage-adjusted minimum wage 0''i and 'it'1 as defined in the previous
section. and other exogenous determinants of employment and enrollment (X).
In addition to the relative minimum wage, we use the prime-age male
unemployment rate as an exogenous labor demand indicator, the relative size
of the teenage cohort as an exogenous supply indicator, and average teacher-9-
salariesand the upper end of the age range of compulsory schooling laws as
exogenous indicators of the demand for education. Compulsoryschoolinglaws
are split into controls for four distinct categories: less than age 16. age
16. age 17. and age 18. We use compulsory school age of 16 as the omitted
reference category in the results described below. Fixed state and year
effects arealso includedtocapturestate-or year-specificvariationin
tastes or abilities or in unmeasureddeterminants ofthe costs and benefits
of these alternative activities. Finally, as before, the model is estimated
with a block-diagonal residual covariance matrix allowing for
heteroskedasticity and AM1) errors.
Results
Parameterestimates from the conditional logit model of youth
activity are presented in Table 2. In the left two columns, we divide
potential youth activities into three distinct groups; (1) employment
(E—SE+ENS). (2) in school and not employed (SNE). and (3) neither in school
nor employed (NSNE). This grouping corresponds closely to column (2) of
Table 2. where we define school enrollment (51) using the employment status
recode.
The results in Panel A indicate that minimum wages reduce both the
proportion in school and the proportion employed relative to the proportion
neither in school nor employed. The sum of the minimum wage coefficients is
statistically significant and negative in both equations. With regard to the
remaining variables, the adult male unemployment rate is estimated to have a
negative effect on employment, but no effect on enrollment. Higher teacher
salaries are estimated to have a positive effect on enrollment and
employment, while compulsory schooling laws have essentially no determinable
effect.
To get a better sense of how to interpret these results. Panel B of
the table shows the estimated implied elasticities of the proportion in each
employment'enrollment category with respect to the minimum wage. Consistent
with the evidence from the results in Table 1. the elasticity of the
proportion employed with respect to the minimum wage is essentially zero-10'
(0.05 and insignificant). However, the results also indicate a significant
negative elasticity (-0.34) of enrollments with respect to the minimum wage
and a positive and significant elasticity (0.67) of the proportion neither in
school nor employed. Thus, the primary net impact of a higher minimum wage
is to increase the proportion of teens neither in school nor employed (NSNE),
and to reduce the proportion in -school (SNE+SE). These findings clearly
indicate that the reduced-form employment equation masks shifts in enrollment
rates of teenagers, and perhaps also minimum wage effects on employment rates
of subgroups of teenagers.
To explore these relationships further, columns (3) to (5) of Panel
A present results that additionally split the employed category into two
distinct groups: in school and employed (SE). and employed but not in school
(ENS) .Thisresults in a model with the four mutually exclusive categories
as originally defined. Consistent with the earlier results, the estimates
show generally statistically significant minimum wage effects that induce
individuals away from each of the employed and/or enrolled groups to the not
enrolled and not employed category. Panel B again shows the implied
elasticities of the proportions of teenagers in each employment-enrollment
category with respect to the minimum wage. As in the three-category
estimates, the largest increase occurs in the proportion of teenagers neither
in school nor working. In this specification, however. -the estimates also
suggest a sizable decline in the proportion in school and employed.
Finally, on net, the employment effect (SE+ENS) is negative, although small.
RobustnessChecks
Table-3reports a variety of estimates of the minimum wage
elasticities implied by the conditional logit model, exploring the robustness
of the results to variations in model specification and the structure of the
covariance matrix. For comparison purposes. Panel A repeats th. baseline
elasticities for the four-category model from Table 2.In Panel B, we report
estimates that exclude the exogenous determinants of schooling (teacher
salaries and compulsory schooling laws). The estimates are little affected
by this omission, suggesting either 'thatthsreis room to improve the'11-
specification of the determinants of enrollment decisions or that enrollment
is little affected by schooling measures. In Panel C. we omit tha lagged
minimum wage variable to focus on the contemporaneous effects of an increase
in the minimum. As expected given the results in our previous paper (Neumark
and Wascher. 1992). some of the effects on schooling and employment are
smaller when the lagged variable is omitted, but not strikingly so. The
estimate of the elasticity of the proportion neither in school nor employed
with respect to the minimum wage is 0.44. about a third less than the
baseline, and still statistically significant.
In Panels 0 and E. we examine the effects of changing the assumed
structure of the covariance matrix. When a single autocorrelation parameter
across all states is estimated (Panel D). the results are nearly identical to
the baseline shown in Panel A. although with larger standard errors. Using a
scalar residual covariance matrix, as in Panel E. leads to some (offsetting)
decline in the minimum wage effects on the two employment categories (SE and
ENS) as well as increased standard errors, but overall the results again are
qualitatively similar.
Finally, in Panel F. we report the elasticities when the model is
estimated excluding the fixed state effects. This should produce results
more analogous to the cross-section results of Ehrenberg and Marcus (1980).
although that study focused on differences in minimum wage effects across
income classes and did not introduce any time-series variation. Nonetheless.
comparisons of the estimates in Panel P with those in Panel A are consistent
with the criticisms of cross-section studies of minimum wage effects put
forth by Freeman (1982). In particular, the estimated disemployment effect
(SE+ENS) rises considerably when th. fixed state effects are excluded.
consistent with Freeman's argument that unmeasured economic conditions across
states could give rise to a positive correlation between wages and employment
and hence a spurious negative correlation between the relative minimum wage
variable and employment. If high wage rates also induce a positive labor
supply response. there could be a spurious positive correlation between the
relative minimum wage variable and the enrollment rate as well; this is
consistent with the finding that the elasticity of the proportion in school-12'
and not employed becomes positive when the state effects are excluded. The
spurious correlations between the relative minimum wage and employment and
enrollment induced by ignoring state effects are roughly offsetting. and the
elasticity of the proportion neither in school nor employed is slightly
smaller (0.58) in this specification.
Interpreting the Results
The structure of the model is not sufficiently complex nor are the
data sufficiently detailed to enable us to infer precisely why the proportion
of teenagers neither in school nor employed rises in response to a higher
minimum wage while the employment rate is little affected. However, the
estimates in Table 2 are consistent with two possibilities.
First, the estimates may be picking up a shift in labor demand
toward higher-skilled workers. One effect of a higher minimum wage is to
raise the cost of lower-skilled labor relative to the cost of higher-quality
substitutes (such as teenagers with more schooling). If high- and low'
skilled teenagers enter separately in the production function, this change in
the relative wage reduces the demand for lower-productivity workers by moving
employers up the demand curve for low-skilled labor. However, the increase
in the minimum wage also shifts out the demand curve for higher-productivity
labor. irducing higher labor supply and employment for these workers. Thus.
if higher-skilled teenagers are more likely to be enrolled in school, and if
school is properly viewed as an alternative to working, this increase in
labor demand will result in a decline in enrollment rates, as the higher'
productivity teenagers choose to enter th, labor market rather than enroll
(or remain enrolled) in school, Moreover, these teenagers will displacesome
relatively lesser'sksll,d teenagers in the work force, mitigating the overall
employment loss associated with the minimum wage and, of course, masking the
employment declines among the less-skilled teens, The displaced lower'
skilled workers would tend to end up neither enrolled nor employedgiven
their presumably lower propensity toward additional schooling. Thus, in the
substitution model, increases in the minimum wage do reduce the employment of
some workers, presumably those who are •the least productive. In this sense.'13-
thecompetitive view of minimum wages applies to this subset of workers, even
though reduced-form employment equations reveal little or no disemployment
effect of the minimum wage for the teenage group in the aggregate,
A second and related possibility is that teenage workers are
homogeneous. but that the higher minimum wage leads some teenagers to leave
school and queue for jobs in the covered sector. br this model to explain
the results, the higher minimum wage must induce an increase in desired labor
supply but have little or no effect on labor demand, Thus, some individuals
leave school and end up neither enrolled nor employed, but there is no
disemployment effect even for a subset of workers.
Note that in both models, the main result is that a higher minimum
wage increases the proportion of teenagers neither enrolled nor employed and
decreases the proportion enrolled. The primary difference is that the
substitution hypothesis suggests that a subset of workers may be "priced out
of the market" relatively permanently by a minimum wage increase, whereas in
the queuing model, the time spent neither enrolled nor employed is more
equally distributed across the teenage population, especially if some
teenagers who queue for minimum wage jobs eventually obtain them,
In our view, there is some evidence suggesting that the substitution
model better characterizes the data, The substitution model predicts an
exogenous effect of enrollments on employment, because as teenagers leave
school to take jobs, the price of their labor should fall, and employment
rise.In contrast, the queuing model predicts essentially no exogenous
effect of enrollments on employment, because the teenagers who leave school
simply queue for minimum wage jobs. The estimates of the coefficient on the
enrollment variable in the employment equations of Table 1 are decidedly
negative, which seems to lend support to the substitution argument. However.
as we indicated. these estimates are potentially contaminated by endogeneity
bias, and if this bias is the main source of the negative partial correlation
between enrollment and employment, these results cannot be used as evidence
in favor of the substitution model, In fact, a greater propensity for
teenagers to join the queue when employment conditions are good would
generate this negative endogeneity bias.-14-
To assess the importance of endogeneity bias, we reestimated the
specifications in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1. instrumenting for the
enrollment rate with the school quality and compulsory schooling variables,
When the proportion of teenagers in school and not in the labor force (Si) is
used as the enrollment variable, the IV procedurs produces a slightly larger
negative coefficient on the enrollment rats ('0.93 with a standard error of
0.28). When the broader enrollment measure (S2) is used, the coefficient
drops slightly to -0.31 with a standard error of 0.26. Thus, the IV results
do not suggest that the negative coefficients on the enrollment rate in the
employment equation are due to endogeneity bias, and in that sense lend
support to the substitution hypothesis.
In addition, the substitution model is. in our view, somewhat more
consistent with the findings of other research on the effects of the minimum
wage, although this research has not addressed the substitution versus
queuing models explicitly. One relevant study is a recent paper by Currie
and Fallick (1993). who study the effects of the minimum wage on the
employment of low'wage workers using panel data on individuals. As long as
there is excess supply at the original minimum wage, an increase in the
number of identical workers queuing for minimum wage jobs should not affect
the probability of job loss for an existing worker. In contrast, this study
finds that the probability of a job loss for a low'wage worker rises 3 to 4
percent with an increase in the minimum wage. a result consistent with the.
prediction of the substitution hypothesis that minimum wages lead to job
losses for some workers.
Another pertinent study is that by Cunningham (1979). who employs a
methodology similar to ours, using stats data from the 1960 and 1910
decennial Censuses of Population. He finds that a higher minimumwage leads
to an increase in full-time employment in the sector covered by minimumwage
laws and a decline in part-tim. employment in-that sector; in addition.
school enrollment among workers in the covered sector falls. This is
consistent with a substitution of higher- for lower-quality workers, as part'
time workers in the covered sector who were also in school increase their
hours (and leave school) and displace the lower-qua),ity workers (who were not-15-
in school). In contrast to our findings. Cunningham's results donot show a
sharp increase in the proportion of teenagers neither in school noremployed,
but instead show thatmostof the displaced workers enter the uncovered
sector. This difference may simply reflect increases in coverage since 1970
that have reduced the size of the uncovered sector. Finally.using cross-
state data from the 1970 Census. Ehrenberg and Marcus (1980) find that for
male teenagers. minimum wage increases redistribute jobs from the childrenof
the poor to the children of the nonpoor. although their resultsusing 1966
NLS data suggest the opposite.
On the other hand. Card (1992b) reports enrollment declines
associated with the 1988 minimum wage increase in California andargues that
these declines "were not directly associated with the relativegrowth in
California employment" (p. 48). He bases his claim on the fact that the
employment rate for enrolled teenagers increased by about as much as the
employment rate for all teenagers following the minimum wage increase.
However, this evidence does not rule out the substitution hypothesis since
there may have been increases in employment among those who remainedenrolled
as well as transitions from employment to enrollment. Thus, on balance, we
view the results reported in these previous studies as moresupportive of the
substitution model than of the queuing model, although, as withour results.
the evidence is indirect.
III. Conelusions
The evidence in this paper indicates that an exclusive focus on the
effects of minimum wages on employment is inadequate for understanding how
minimum wages influence the low-wage labor market. In particular, the
sensitivity of the estimated disemployment effect of minimum wages for
teenagers to the inclusion or exclusion of the school enrollment rate
suggests that there is an important interaction between schooling,
employment, and the minimum wage that has been ignored in much of the recent
literature.
To study these linkages more carefully, we broaden the analysis of
the effects of the minimum wage using a conditional logit model of-16-
alternative employment and enrollment outcomes. Estimates from this model
consistently show a negative influence of a higher minimum wage on school
enrollment. Perhaps most importantly, we find that there is a significant
increase in the proportion of teenagers neither in school nor employed in
response to art increase in the minimum wage.
The results in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that a
higher minimum wage leads employers to substitute away from low-productivity
teenagers toward higher-productivity teenagers. This increase in the demand
for higher-quality workers induces a labor supply response among teenagers
who were formerly in school. The upshot is that lower-productivity workers
are displaced by higher-productivity teens (who also leave school), and
become neither employed nor enrolled. Under this interpretation, reduced-
form estimates of minimum wage effects on employment mask disemployment
effects among the least productive workers. The results are also consistent.
although in our view less so. with the hypothesis that, as a result of a
minimum wage increase, teenagers leave school to queue for minimum wage jobs.
without any disemployment effect among those already employed. Of course.
some individuals who queue for minimum wage jobs will. eventually find
employment so that in either case, some teenagers leave school for work.
Whether a minimum wage-induced transition from school to work is
desirable from a policy perspective is ambiguous, depending on.among other
factors, the substitutability of experience for education in a human capital
production function. However, individuals displaced from both school and
work seem unambiguously worse off. Whatever the welfare evaluation of these
changes. the results clearly indicate that focusing solely on the reduced-
form estimates of minimum wage effects on employment maskschangesin school
enrollments of teenagers and perhaps also changes in employment that should
be of interest to policymakers.'17-
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Press pp. 155-185.Table 1: Within-Group Estimates of Minimum Wage Effects on Employment, Teenagera (16.19)i
reetner(I6-lc
(1) (2) (3)
Minimumwagc .13 -.13 .01
(.11) (.07) (.10)
Minimum wage, -.18 -.11 -.23
lagged one year (.12) (.08) (.11)
Proportionofagegroupin -.78
school and not employed (Si) (03)
Proporion of age group with -.39
major activity school ($2) (.03)
Minimum wage elasticity2 -23 -.23
(13) (.08) (.ii)
1. Thesamplecoven the 50 Mates and Wathingtoa D.C., (or the yean i978-1989. Standard errors an reponed in parentheses.
The minimum wage variable is the minimum wage leveL multiplied by covenge, divided by theaverage wage in the azaic. All sethficjtjops include fixed as. ccandyear cit atheunemployment race for prime-age male., and the proponioc of the
popuiacion in the age group. The nhilninallow(or different residuai cant variances across states, and An cacti, with
different autocorrelation parameters serosa slain. The .'ii—'tnarccomputed by estimating the autocoerelacioo parameter (tool
the OLS residuals for each state, quasi'diffcrcneing (drcpping the rmobseivadon),and applying GL.S.
2. Long-run elasticity, evaluated at ample means. Standard ens treat coefficient estimates, but notmeans, as random.Table 2: Conditional Lcgii Estimates of Minim tam Wage Effects on Employment and School Enrollacas, Teenager. (16-19)'
AFsIi,npte,'
lisin,EndStintsRecode(Sit Ulne Ems Staluc Recode and Mijo. Activit, (2l
S/NSNE E/NSNE SNE/NSNE SE/NSNEEflS/N5p4g
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Coverage-adjusted relative -2.26 47 -1.40 -133 -.15
minimumwage (.60) (.63) (.70) (.79) (.75)
Covenge-adjusted relative -.63 -1.31 -.86 -1.56 -.95
minimum wage, lagged (.61) (.71) (.75) (.88) (.83) yw
Proportionot population .06 -1.43 -1.14 -234 -.61
aged 1649 (1.14) (1.28) (125) (1.60) (1.49)
Prime-age male 34 -2.65 1.76 -1.69 -2.17
umcmploym.as nEc (36) (.62) (.61) (.79) (.64)
Commlsory ichool agecló -.04 -.04 .15 .13 -.11
(21) (.21) (.23) (29) (.32)
Compulsoty school age-I? -.12 .01 -.10 -.08 -.07
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.12) (.09)
Compulsory school age- IS -.21 -06 -.05 0? -.05
(.10) (.11) (.10) (.14) (.11)
Average teacher 3.42 2.41 .57 -128 1.88
salaries/laO (1.03) (Ifl) (128) (131) (1.45)
Sum at minimum wage -2.90 -1.78 -2.26 -3.08 -1.11 effects (45) (49) (.76) (.89) (.77)Table 2 (continued)
B. Minimum Wa'e Elnijcidc.'
Mean Predicted Mean Predicted
proportion change proportion change (I) (2) (3) (4) Proportionin school (5) .40 .34 Proportion inschool, .45 •.13
(.17) not employed (SNE) (.11)
Proportion employed(E) .43 .05 Proportion in school, .21 -.40
(.16) employed (SE) (27)
Proportionnotin school, .17 .67 Proportion employed, .n .28
not employed (NSNE) (.14) notinschool (ENS) (.25)
Proportioenotinschool, .12 .64
notemployed(NSNE) (.14)
I. The samplecoven the $0statesand Washington, D.C.. (or the years 1978-1989.
2. Standard errors arc reported inparentheses.The minimum wage variable is the minimum wage kvel multiplied bycoverage, divided by the average wage in the state. All specifications include fixed state arid year effects. Compulsosy
schooling age of 16 is the omitted reference category. The estimates allow lot different residual error variance. acrossMates, and AR! errors
with different autocorrelation parameters across slates The estimates arc cocipuled by estimating the auzocorrelation
parameter
From the 01.5 residuals for each state, quasi-diflereacing (dropping the first observation), and applying CU tion-by-cquaiion
to the quasidif1ertnced data. (This latter step is equivalent to applying CU to the system of equations for the quasi-differenced
data.)
3. Mean proportions are sample means. Predicted changes are evaluated at sample means. Standarderrors of predicted changes
are eaJculaced treating sample means as fixed, and coefficient estimates as random, using first-order linear approximations to the
nonlinear functions of the parimeter estimates Wbile the estimated minimum-wage elasticities are independent of which
category is the reference category in the conditional lot estimation, the standard errorsvary slightly based on this choke, since the first.
order approximation used in the standard error calculation varies.Tabk 3: Seuthivity Aaa1ysis toe Logit Enimaics.
Mthimumi WageF1.I41in1











SHE SE ENS NSNE
.14 -.40 .29 £7
(.17) (27) (.25) (.14)
C. Omittin, Lsn.4 Mi.iniam Ws,c EIFs
SHE SE ENS NSNE
-.14 -27 28 .44
(.14) (.22) (20) (.12)
I). Shirk Aalnroryelstjnn Psramnn frw Each Stale
SHE SE ENS NSNE
-.09 -30 29 £5
(.19) (31) (.27) (.16)
EHomnakedailic Nnn-A.lnear,ehtr4 Errors
SHE SE ENS HSNE
-.15 -.11 .12 .60
(.24) (.38) (36) (.20)
F No Flint Stale Effects
SHE SE ENS NSHE
.04 -30 -.11 38
(.10) (20) (.14) (.08)Appendix Tabk: Descriptive Statistics
Charseterissiesat Teenann (16-1Q
MeanStandard deviatiOn Minimum Maximum
Employment rate .43 .09 .09 .67
Proportion of population .09 .06 .14
aged 16-19
Proportion of population in .40 .08 .17 .73
schoolandnOt employed (Si)
Proportionof age group with 45 .39
major activity in school (52)
Stale rhnaeieriuit,
MeanStandard deviation Minimum Maximum
Coverage-adjusted relative .35 .04 .25 .49
minimum wage
Prime-age male (2544) .05 03 .20
unemployment rate
Average teacher salaries 20.1 3.7 13.8 35.7
(1,0W 1982 dollars)
CompuJsoq school age Proportion# changes to S changes from
<16 .04 0 2
16 .67 3 7 Ii .14 5 2
18 .14 4 1
1. The sample covers the 50 states and Washington, D.C for the years 1978-1989. The minimum wage levol is the greater of
the states or federal minimum wage level. The coverage rats is coverage by federal minimum wage laws for all workers in the
Mate, divided by the avenge wage in the state. Information on teacher salaries and compulsoty schooling ages is taken from
various years of Dinsi of E4nracion Smut U.S. Depan.meat of PA.nttnn.iNationalCcatcr for Education Statistics, Euimatn
of Schnol Stnistia National Education Assodatioa, and Iadthrc of Pithik FIew,ljurv and Snrndarv Day Schoo& U.S.
Department of Education. National Caner (or Education Statistics.